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1.  Introduction 
In the 1980s Ireland’s labour market was one of the worst performing in Europe.   The 
unemployment rate rose from 7 per cent in 1979 to 17 per cent in 1986, when two thirds 
of the unemployed had been out of work for six months or more, almost half for over a 
year.  An already-low labour force participation rate fell further.  At the end of the decade 
net emigration more than offset the rate of natural increase, leading to population decline.  
An influential comparative study of unemployment in OECD countries estimated that the 
Irish equilibrium or natural unemployment rate had risen from 9 per cent over the period 
1969-79 to 13.1 per cent between 1980 and 1988 (Layard, Nickell, and Jackman, p. 436).   
 
The picture was transformed during the 1990s.  The labour market situation improved, 
slowly at first but then at a pace that took commentators by surprise.  Between the trough 
in 1986-87 and 2002 total employment grew by 62 per cent and non-agricultural 
employment by over 78 per cent.  The numbers at work in the public sector declined, so 
non-agricultural private sector employment grew even faster.  By 2000 the 
unemployment rate had fallen below 4 per cent, long-term unemployment had virtually 
disappeared, the labour force participation rate was not far behind the levels recorded in 
Sweden and Denmark, and the age-old Irish problems of emigration and population 
decline had given way to the highest rate of net immigration and the fastest growing 
population in the EU.  There was general agreement that full employment had been 
reached – if not surpassed.  Ireland’s success over this period compares favourably with 
what has been labelled the US “employment miracle” (Krueger and Pischke, 1997).   And 
Ireland easily met the Maastricht inflation criterion; Irish inflation was lower than 
German in 1997.  Even at the time of writing, more than a year since the economy came   3 
off the boil, the increase in the Irish unemployment rate has been very slight and the 
annual rate of net immigration is still over one percent of the population.  Although the 
inflation rate was significantly above the Eurozone average in 2001-02, this has been 
attributed more to the catch-up of living standards in the non-traded sectors of the 
economy – á la Balassa-Samuelson  - than to effects of an overheating labour market. 
  
This paper examines these developments in detail and presents an interpretation of the 
Irish experience.  The next section contains a detailed description of what happened.  The 
following section looks at the factors that may be invoked to explain the very favourable 
Irish experience.  The paper concludes with a brief discussion of what lessons, if any, 





Ireland was for long an extreme example of a labour surplus economy.  The famines of 
the 1840s triggered large-scale emigration and a decline in the national population that 
lasted until the 1960s.  Even then subsistence farmers and unskilled urban workers 
predominated in the employed labour force.  Employment opportunities in industry and 
services were limited, but overt unemployment was kept in check by the continued 
operation of the safety value of emigration, mainly to the United Kingdom.  During the 
1960s there was a slight increase in the population and numbers at work, but these 
modest gains were dissipated in the recessions of the 1970s.  An inappropriate fiscal 
stimulus in 1977 yielded a short-lived growth spurt and launched the economy on an 
                                                 
1 For an extended account of Ireland’s economic fortunes since the 1960s see Honohan and Walsh, 2002.   4 
unsustainable debt-GDP trajectory.  A pro-cyclical fiscal policy intensified the effects of 
the global recession in the early 1980s.  The painful correction lasted well into the second 
half of the decade.    
 
The effects of the long recession on the Irish labour force were devastating.  The 
unemployment rate reached record levels – peaking at 17 per cent in 1986-87 -  the 
labour force participation rate declined, and emigration resumed as soon as employment 
opportunities presented themselves abroad.  The numbers employed in the productive 
sectors of the economy fell over these years, whilst the numbers in all the dependent 
categories (except children) increased.   Despite the falling birth rate, the employment 
dependency ratio (that is, the inactive to employed in the total population times 100) rose 
from an already exceptionally high 200 in 1981 to a peak of 224 in 1986.  It fell back to 
213 in 1991 mainly because of the continued fall in the number of children and the 
resumption of emigration.   
 
The historic link between Irish and British labour markets had in the past ensured that the 
Irish unemployment rate would rise no more than two or three percentage points above 
the British, but this relationship seemed to have broken down in the 1980s, possibly due 
to the severity of the recession in the UK and the collapse in the demand for unskilled 
workers in construction and industry. By the late 1980s the gap between the two rates had 
reached an unprecedented nine percentage points and once recovery got underway in 
Britain it was to be expected that a pent-up tide of Irish emigrants would flow out.  And 
in fact the initial easing of the labour market problem came in the form of renewed   5 
emigration to the UK and US as these economies emerged from recession sooner than 
Ireland.   
 
Renewed emigration stabilized Irish unemployment in the late 1980s, but the continued 
rapid fall in the 1990s was increasingly due to the domestic employment boom, as the 
change in the country’s economic fortunes that began in the late 1980s transformed the 
labour market situation.  Figures 1 through 4 summarise these developments.
2  After 
1992 the unemployment rate fell rapidly and the participation rate rose sharply, a 
combination that resulted in a steep rise in the employment/population ratio.
3  The long-
term unemployment rate fell even faster than the overall unemployment rate, reaching 1.2 
per cent in 2000.  The short-term unemployment – usually taken as a more sensitive 
measure of labour market conditions - fell to 2.5 per cent and the traditional differential 
between youth and prime age unemployment rates among males disappeared.   All of 
these indicators support the view that the unemployment problem had been solved.  And 
indeed this was the general perception, with the media becoming preoccupied with labour 
shortages, unfilled vacancies, and the issues raised by substantial immigration.  
 
The rise in the labour force participation rate was due mainly to the retention of more 
married women in the labour force.  By 2002, 62 per cent of married women aged 35-44 
were economically active on ILO definitions, compared with only 29 per cent in 1988.  
                                                 
2 I have relied mainly on the Irish household survey for the data in this paper.  A Quarterly National 
Household Survey (QNHS) replaced the annual Labour Force Survey (LFS) in September 1997.  The 
definitions of labour force status used in the paper are based on the ILO classification since 1988.  The 
introduction of a new questionnaire in 1998 over may have raised the numbers recorded as “employed” – 
note the kink at 1998 in Figure 2. 
3 The continued fall in the number of children in the population further contributed to reversing the rise in 
the dependency ratio, which had fallen to 121 by 2002.   6 
The availability of affordable childcare rather than of job opportunities is now seen as the 
binding constraint on higher participation rate among women with children. 
 
Not surprisingly, the trend towards higher participation among married women has 
increased the number of households with more than one employed member.  However, 
the polarization of households into work-rich and work-poor noted in Britain was not a 
feature of the Irish boom (Gregg, Hansen, and Wadsworth, 2000). Work-rich households 
– those with no-one unemployed and two or more employed – increased from 22.7 per 
cent of all households in 1988 to 30.9 per cent in 1997.  But work-poor household – those 
with at least one unemployed person and no-one employed – fell from 12.7 to 8.9 per 
cent of all households that contained at least one economically active member.   
[To be updated.]   
 
In most OECD countries part-time contracts have contributed more than half of all recent 
employment growth.  The extreme example was the Netherlands, where women working 
part-time in the service sector accounted for over half the total increase in employment 
between 1983 and 1997 (Garibaldi and Mauro, 2002).  In contrast, the Irish employment 
boom was biased towards full-time jobs.  Women working part-time accounted for only 
26 per cent of the total growth in employment between 1988 and 2002 (Table 1).  While 
the share of part-time working among women rose from 16.5 to 30.4 per cent, the 
proportion of these declaring themselves “underemployed” was only 0.7 per cent.    
 
 





Table 1:  Contribution to employment growth by 
gender and part-time/full-time, 1988-2002 
                                    per cent 
Men    
  Full-time    36.2 
  Part-time     6.2 
Women    
  Full-time    32.1 
  Part-time    25.6 
Total 100.0 
Source: Quarterly National Household Survey 
 
Nor was the growth in the numbers at work or the decline in unemployment unduly 
dependent on the expansion of public sector employment schemes designed to provide 
work for the long-term unemployed and other hard-to-employ categories.  The 
employment boom started during a period of fiscal austerity when the numbers at work in 
the core areas of public administration declined and employment in public services such 
as health and education was held in check.  However, a variety of special employment 
schemes was introduced during the 1980s and 1990s to alleviate unemployment.  These 
comprised a mixture of (i) subsidies to regular employment in the private sector, (ii) 
support for unemployed persons starting enterprises, and (ii) direct employment on 
special schemes.  The numbers employed on the largest of these – the Community 
Employment Scheme - rose from about 1 per cent of the labour force in the late 1980s to   8 
a peak of 2.8 per cent in 1995, falling back to 2 per cent by 2001.
4  It has been estimated 
that about half of those leaving these schemes return to unemployment, so they may be 
credited with taking about one percentage point off the total unemployment rate. But 
since many participants churn through the system, interrupting spells of unemployment 
with spells on schemes, the impact on the long-run term unemployment is greater 
(O’Connell, 2000).  Nonetheless, given how low the short-term unemployment rate has 
fallen, the displacement from long-term to short-term unemployment cannot be large.  
 
These schemes are now criticized for having become part of the problem of structural 
adjustment rather than part of the solution because so few participants move on to normal 
employment.  At a time when work permits are being issued to non-EU immigrants to 
take low-paid jobs in the private sector at a rate equaling about 2 per cent of the labour 
force each year, the rationale for public sector schemes to provide work for the hard-to-
employ is being queried.  The provision for these schemes in 2003 has been reduced by 
about a quarter.  
 
The social welfare system has also been used to encourage some of the unemployed to 
reclassify as retired.  During the 1980s the system was modified to encourage people 
approaching retirement age (65) to change their unemployment allowance into a “pre-
retirement allowance” on condition that they withdraw from the labour force.  The 
numbers on this scheme reached 15,000 in the early 1990s but fell to less than 12,000 in 
2001.  Out of a labour force of 1.8 million this is not significant.  The labour force 
participation rate among men aged 60-64 – the principal category affected by these 
                                                 
4 These figures are from special tabulations of the QNHS furnished by the Central Statistics Office. They   9 
measures – dropped from 60.6 per cent in 1988 to 55.6 per cent in 2002. Some of this 
reduction may be due to the changes in the social welfare code, but other factors, such as 
improved private sector pension provision and the declining number of farmers, would 
also have contributed to early retirement among this group.  Moreover, the Irish 
participation rate among older males remains considerable above the average for OECD-
Europe.  
 
Broader measures of the potential labour force support the view that very little labour 
market slack remained by the end of the decade.  Supplementary measures of potential 
labour supply have been published since 1998.   The aim of these is  
..to take into account, in addition to the unemployed, groups outside the 
labour force who have indicated some interest in obtaining a job.  These 
extra groups include discouraged workers (who are not looking for work 
as they believe they are not qualified or that no work is available) and 
other groups who want work but do not meet the ILO criteria to be 
classified as unemployed. (Central Statistics Office, notes to QNHS)  
 
A broad rate of labour availability that includes all these extra categories (as well as 
underemployed part-time workers) in both numerator and denominator was 23 per cent in 
1988, compared with an unemployment rate of 16 per cent; in 2002 it was 8 per cent 
compared with a 4 per cent unemployment rate.  Subtracting the narrow unemployment 
rate from the broad measure we obtain a “discouraged worker and underemployment 
rate”.  Figure 5 shows that this measure remained fairly stable until 1997 and then 
declined steeply.   
 
                                                                                                                                                 
refer to those reported as employed on “government schemes” at the time of the Survey.  The flow through 
the schemes in the course of a year is higher. Many of the supported jobs are part-time.   10 
To summarise, the Irish employment boom and fall in unemployment cannot be 
dismissed as artifacts of make-work schemes or policies designed to disguise 
unemployment.    While there has been a growth in part-time employment of women, this 
appears to be voluntary and underemployment among them is very low.  While special 
employment schemes absorbed an increased proportion of the labour force in the 1990s, 
by the end of the decade their impact on the aggregate labour market statistics was 
modest. The same is true of social welfare inducements to early retirement.  The broadest 
measure of potential labour supply, which includes those with only a marginal interest in 
employment, has fallen as rapidly as the conventional unemployment rate.  
 
3.  Accounting for the transformation 
5 
I approach the task of explaining Ireland’s phenomenal labour market success in two 
stages.  First I identify the exogenous factors that accounted for the output boom, and 
then I look at the factors that translated the output boom into an employment boom.  This 
approach makes the topic tractable even though an understanding of the growth of the 
economy cannot be divorced from an analysis of the performance of the labour market.  
 
3.1 Exogenous explanations for the boom 
The boom in output is the key to understanding the Irish success in virtually eliminating 
its unemployment problem during the 1990s.  Between 1993 and 2000 the real GNP 
growth rate averaged 8 per cent.
6   Since there was no marked jump in the rate of increase 
                                                 
5 This section draws heavily on the relevant sections of Honohan and Walsh, 2002. 
6 It is preferable to use GNP rather than GDP when tracking the performance of the Irish economy.  The 
reasons – which relate to the importance of MNCs in the economy - are discussed at length in Honohan and 
Walsh, 2002.  See also Appendix 1 to this paper.   11 
in (labour) productivity, the extraordinary growth rate of output was accompanied by a 
very rapid increase in the numbers at work.  
 
Several exogenous factors contributed to the Irish boom.  It coincided with the strongest 
expansion in the US economy since the Second World War.  The buoyancy of the global 
economy spilled over to Ireland through the increased flow of FDI from the US, as well 
as through strong demand in exports markets in Britain, Europe, and the US.  Having 
redressed the imbalances that emerged in the domestic economy in the late 1970s, and 
offering a low corporation tax regime to manufacturing firms, the Irish economy was well 
positioned to benefit from these favourable external developments.  Growth was further 
fuelled by the fall in Irish real interest rates following the virtual collapse of the European 
Monetary System in 1993 and the period of generalized exchange rate floating that 
followed.  Irish real interest rates have been negative since nominal rates fell to German 
levels after the launch of the euro in 1999. 
 
The inflow of FDI to Ireland has attracted considerable international attention and tends 
to be given much of the credit for the boom.   For example, a recent study claimed that 
“the exogenous driving force [in Ireland’s] success was a well-thought out strategy to 
attract foreign direct investment”  (Garibaldi and Mauro, 2002, p 73).  But this 
interpretation ignores the fact that the Irish inducements to FDI had been in place for 
many years – in fact they were scaled back over the 1990s, although possibly they 
became better targeted. Moreover the impact of the new firms on the economy is easily 
exaggerated.  It is true that their direct contribution to the employment boom was not 
trivial.   The “high tech” manufacturing sectors where MNCs predominate increased their   12 
share of total employment from 7.3 per cent in 1985 to 9.0 in 2000, accounting for about 
13 per cent of the total employment growth.  The growth of industrial employment in 
Ireland over this period bucked the general downward trend in OECD countries.  But 
employment in “marketed services” (as distinct from public sector service employment – 
including everything from international financial services to tourism) grew fastest, 
contributing over 40 per cent of the total increase.
7  
 
Another favourable exogenous development – whose importance is also often 
exaggerated – was the increased inflow of EU structural funds from 1988.  They came at 
an opportune time, helping to fund a resumption of public capital spending which had 
been pared down as part of the fiscal adjustment and acting counter-cyclically by 
insulating Ireland from the Gulf War recession. These very substantial transfers are 
estimated to have lifted the level of Irish GDP on a sustained basis by as much as 4 per 
cent. While not trivial, this boost is dwarfed by the exceptional growth rates recorded 
after 1993.    
 
  3.2 Translating output growth into extra employment 
It would not have been possible for real GNP to grow by 8 per cent a year over the period 
1993-2000 without a very elastic labour supply.  Since the initial high level of 
unemployment contributed to this elasticity, the rate of growth of output was not a purely 
exogenous variable that can be used to explain the fall in unemployment.
8   None the less 
it is worth noting that despite the rise in the participation rate and the reversal of 
                                                 
7 But we should not overlook the fact that the preferential 10 per cent Corporation Tax rate was extended to 
internationally traded financial services located in a designated area of Dublin during the 1980s, where over 
8,000 people are now employed. 
8 See Walsh (2000) for a more technical discussion of this point.   13 
migration flows, the link between the growth of GDP and the fall in the unemployment 
rate during the 1990s is similar to that estimated over earlier periods (Walsh, 2000).  The 
correlation between these variables remained high (
_
R
2 = 0.70) and the implied steady-
state GDP growth rate of 4.3 per cent is much the same as earlier estimates (Figure 6).     
 
In addition to the high initial level of unemployment the factors that contributed to the 
elastic labour supply included:  
•  A high rate of natural increase of the working age population, as the baby boom 
of the 1960s and 1970s came on the labour market. Increased expenditure on 
education in earlier years assured that the labour force entrants were well-
qualified.  
•  Low initial labour force participation rates, especially among married women. 
•  The openness of the labour market to migration flows.  The initial inflows 
contained a significant proportion of returning emigrants, but in later years non-
Irish immigrants predominated.   
In the early phase of the expansion, the growing demand for labour could be met from the 
natural growth of the labour force and returning emigrants.  The impact on the non-
employed population lagged. As late as 1997, the OECD survey of the Irish economy 
noted that “despite rapid employment growth the unemployment rate remains high, 
participation rate are low, and net emigration has been substantial”,
9 but this was already 
changing dramatically. 
 
                                                 
9These where sub-headings in the section on the “Labour market and economic performance” in the OECD 
Economic Survey of Ireland 1997.    14 
An elastic labour supply was not a new phenomenon in Ireland in the 1990s but success 
in absorbing it into employment – rather than dissipating it in emigration, unemployment, 
and non-participation – was.  The immediate reason for this change was improved wage 
competitiveness, which made the country a more attractive location for investment 
(Honohan and Walsh, 2002).  Figure 7 shows Irish (i) wages
10 and (ii) unit wage costs in 
a common currency relative to a weighted average of our trading partners.
11  Whereas the 
latter declined steadily since 1980, the former deteriorated until the mid-1980s and then 
reversed trend in 1987.  This is more closely correlated with the pattern of employment 
and there are reasons for believing it to be a truer reflection of the changing 
competitiveness of Irish industry (see Appendix 1).    
 
The improvement in competitiveness was, in turn, due to several developments.  The 
devaluation of the Irish pound in 1986 and 1993 played a part.  While a weaker currency 
is not likely to bestow a permanent advantage, it did provide temporary boosts at key 
junctures in the recovery.  Higher productivity may also be invoked, but this was partly 
endogenous – reflecting the dramatic impact of new industries on the aggregate figures 
(see Appendix 1).  There was no marked jump in the rate of improvement of productivity 
in existing firms.  The main factor that needs to be considered – and the one that receives 
the lion’s share of the credit from many Irish commentators – is the return to central wage 
bargaining or “social partnership” in 1987.    This is discussed in the following section.  
 
3.3 The return to centralised wage bargaining  
                                                 
10 That is, average hourly earnings, not including employer’s taxes and social charges. 
11Note the very different scales on the y-axes: the second measure shows a much more dramatic improvement 
than the first.    15 
The disastrous labour market trends of the 1980s had hit the Irish trade union movement 
very hard.  Union membership, which had been growing rapidly from the 1960s, peaked 
in 1980 and declined steadily until the 1990s.  Union density declined even more rapidly 
and did not recover, as most of the new jobs created in the booming economy were in 
union-free workplaces.  However, there was no explicit government agenda to curb union 
power, along Thatcherite lines. On the contrary, the role of unions was strengthened by 
the revival and deepening of a centralized bargaining process that went beyond wages to 
cover taxation and other aspects of economic policy. 
 
In 1987 a new centralized agreement was negotiated in very altered circumstances from 
Ireland’s earlier experimentation with corporatism at the end of the 1970s. The much-
weakened unions were glad of the life-line thrown to them by social partnership. The 
unprecedented unemployment rate – attributable not only to the economy’s poor 
performance but also to the exogenous shock of high British unemployment - led to a 
widespread consensus that generalized belt-tightening was needed.  The first National 
Wage Agreement was followed by four others, negotiated over successive 3-4 year 
horizons extending from 1988 to 2003, each exceeding the previous in its ambition and 
scope.  The range of objectives now extended far beyond the basic goal of promoting 
industrial peace and keeping the economy competitive to objectives like ‘bringing about a 
fairer and more inclusive Ireland’ and ‘promoting an entrepreneurial culture’ (see 
Appendix 2).   
 
Admirers of the partnership approach, with its use of a broad tax-based incomes policy, 
claim that by almost eliminating industrial disputes and moderating real wage growth it 
deserves much of the credit for the exceptional growth in employment in the 1990s.  The   16 
strike rate fell to a much lower level after the new wage bargaining system was launched 
and by the end of the decade had ceased to be a general problem, although militancy has 
recently increased among public sector unions.  
 
How much of the improved competitiveness should be attributed to the new pay 
negotiation environment?  Several authors have analyzed why the upward relative trend 
of Irish wages was halted in 1986 but the underlying factors have proved resistant to an 
agreed econometric explanation. Much of the short-term fluctuation in the relative 
position is attributable to autonomous exchange rate changes involving sterling and the 
US dollar. Indeed, once these are allowed for, it is hard to identify a statistically 
significant role for the domestic unemployment rate, let alone the pay bargaining regime 
(Curtis and FitzGerald, 1996; Walsh, 2000).  But exchange rate movements are 
implausible as an explanation of the sustained reversal of trend.  Despite the inconclusive 
econometric results, most observers regard the coincidence of timing of the reversal of 
the deteriorating trend in competitiveness with the new approach to pay bargaining as 
suggestive that the latter did pay dividends.  
 
A key feature of the national wage agreements was the lowering of the burden of taxation 
on employees.  The reductions in tax rates were an implicit part of the negotiation of each 
agreement, with government promising income tax ‘concessions’ in return for pay 
moderation.  As well as the rapidly falling top marginal tax rates, the income tax 
thresholds were raised sharply in real terms, taking more and more of the lower-paid out 
of the income tax net.  But this was a somewhat Faustian bargain in that the process of 
lowering tax rates had a natural limit influenced by public perceptions of the adequacy of 
the provision of public services. Indeed, targeted improvements to public services   17 
became part of the later pay bargains.  And these debates were overtaken by the rapid 
deterioration in the public finances after 2000.  By 2002 tax increases were needed to halt 
the deficit’s growth.  
 
Moreover, by 1998 there was considerable drift in actual private sector wage rates above 
what was agreed in the national agreements.  The era of wage restraint seemed nearing its 
end.  Fortuitously though the weakness of the euro between 1999 and 2001 helped keep 
Irish labour competitive despite accelerating nominal wage increases.  The recovery of 
the euro in 2002 accounts for the up-tick in the competitiveness series (Figure 7). 
 
In summary, while the jury is still out on the long-run impact of centralised wage 
bargaining, it seemed to play some role in the timing of the economic recovery and the 
subsequent employment boom. 
 
3.4  Removing structural rigidities 
The point of departure was a fairly Spartan social welfare system and relatively market-
friendly policies, but serious disincentives and anomalies existed and were invoked as 
reasons for the persistence of high unemployment.  It is natural to ask whether the Irish 
case vindicates or refutes the emphasis in the OECD Jobs Strategy on reforms in the tax 
and benefit systems and increased labour market flexibility as preconditions for improved 
labour market outcomes.  If these policies are effective, it is hard to imagine more 
favourable circumstance for implementing them than during the buoy any labour market 
conditions that prevailed in Ireland in the 1990s.   Not surprisingly the OECD itself   18 
reviewed progress on these fronts in its Economic Surveys of Ireland in 1997 and 1999.  
It recognized that Ireland made progress in many areas, notably by 
•  A preventative approach to long-term unemployment.  Since September 
1998 all those who have been unemployed for six months are called for 
interview to assess where they are apt for an existing vacancy or in need of 
training.  To cite the OECD, “a surprisingly high share of these can be 
dealt with in this fashion: nearly half either failed to attend the interview 
or refused intervention, and 28 per cent were struck off the rolls . . .”  
(OECD, 1999, p. 127).   This helped close the very large gap that had 
emerged between registered unemployment and unemployment as 
measured on an ILO basis.  But while there was a fall in the long-term 
unemployment rate after 1988, the major reductions did not occur until 
much later (Figure 4a).
12   
•  Active labour market policies. A plethora of special employment schemes 
and other active labour market initiatives was introduced.  Spending on 
these reached 1½ per cent of GDP in the late 1980s.  The most costly 
measure is the Community Employment scheme, which has been 
discussed above.  OECD data reveal that Ireland moved well up the league 
table on spending on such ‘active labour market policies’ between 1985 
and 1997 - from 14% of average industrial earnings per person 
unemployed in 1985 to 29% in 1997, when only the Netherlands and the 
Scandinavian countries were higher.  This level of spending has proved 
controversial, and though there is some microeconometric evidence to   19 
suggest that the increased emphasis on ‘back to work’ measures did help a 
little in improving the functioning of the labour market in the 1990s, its 
role should not be exaggerated (Martin, 2000).   This expenditure has 
come under closer scrutiny in current more constrained budgetary context 
and is likely to be significantly reduced and rationalized.
13  
•  Reducing the work disincentives in the benefit system.   Higher 
replacement ratios were blamed for about half the rise in the Irish 
structural unemployment rate between the 1970s and the mid-1990s 
(Scarpetta, 1996), but the disincentive effects that have been uncovered 
appear to be small compared to those reported in the international 
literature and the largest effects are reported among relatively advantaged 
unemployed groups and not the long term unemployed who constitute 
such a large proportion of the core unemployment problem in Europe 
(Layte and Callan, 2001).   Net replacement ratios – never very high by 
European standards - stabilized and in some cases declined in the 1990s.  
This was due to changes in both the income tax code and in the social 
welfare system.  The marginal income tax rate (including social security 
charges) facing an unmarried industrial worker on average wages peaked 
at 68.5 per cent in 1984.  By 2002 this had fallen to 48 per cent.  Marginal 
tax rates facing other categories of workers also declined, although less 
dramatically.  Many low-paid workers were completely removed from the 
income net by progressively raising the tax threshold, which for an 
                                                                                                                                                 
12 As a simple test for a break in the link between output growth and unemployment, I added a post-1988 
dummy to the Okun relationship.  While the coefficient was negative it was not statistically significant. 
13 Recent newspaper accounts suggest that places on the various training and special placement scheme exceed 
the numbers unemployed.    20 
unmarried worker reached half average industrial earnings in 2002.  The 
introduction of “individualization” in the income tax code greatly 
increased the after-tax returns to a second income earner in a household.   
Certain benefits such as rent supplements are no longer withdrawn on 
taking up employment and child benefits have been increased and 
uncoupled from unemployment benefits.  But while moving in the right 
direction, these changes were hardly sufficient to account for much of the 
dramatic fall in unemployment and rise in employment.    
•  Increased real wage flexibility?  Greater wage flexibility may also have 
contributed to the improved labour market performance. Low inflation and 
a falling tax burden reinforced nominal wage moderation even as the 
unemployment rate plummeted in the second half of the 1990s.  The 
natural rate of unemployment seemed to be shifting inwards faster than it 
was said to have shifted outwards during the 1980s.  But as the 
unemployment rate fell to unprecedented levels, wage inflation pressures 
did build up.  In the public sector in particular numerous groups 
clamoured for large pay increases in order to participate in the country's 
new-found prosperity.  However, when the slowdown in global activity in 
the technology sectors hit Ireland, anecdotal evidence and the behaviour of 
income tax receipts
14 suggest that wages and salaries adjusted downward– 
particularly through the non-payment of bonuses - in sectors where 
employment is at risk. 
   21 
But not all policy changes went in the direction of greater labour market flexibility.  In 
particular, the introduction of a statutory national minimum wage at about 55 per cent of 
average industrial earnings in 2000 was viewed some apprehension by employers and 
many commentators. The minimum wage has since been increased to keep pace with 
wage inflation but its effects on employment levels have been small (Nolan, O’Neill, and 
Williams, 2002).   
 
It is also striking that the social partnership process did not result in any major legal, 
procedural, or institutional changes in the industrial relations framework.  Thorny 
questions of labour union recognition and negotiation rights, and the binding nature of 
Labour Court recommendations, remain unresolved.  The current national wage 
agreement (the Programme for Prosperity and Fairness) set up a Public Sector 
Benchmarking Body in an attempt to tackle recurrent relativity and productivity issues in 
pubic sector pay.  Its first report - issued in June 2002 - recommended special pay 
increases ranging from 4 to 25 per cent for various categories of public service 
employees.  The whole process has been severely criticized by a former member of the 
Body, who claimed that it failed to address the need to encourage modernization and the 
acceptance of performance-related pay in the public sector (O’Leary, 2002).  The direct 
and indirect budgetary implications of implementing this report at a time of increasing 
fiscal strain are serious and any additional outlay incurred is unlikely to contribute much 
to the more efficient functioning of the labour market.  
      
                                                                                                                                                 
14 Tax revenue fell much more rapidly than the numbers at work and one explanation offered has been the 
collapse of bonuses and performance-related pay.  Recent changes in the structure of income taxation have 
made revenue more sensitive to levels of pay among the highest paid.    22 
Nor did Ireland take a radical approach to product market deregulation.  Such 
privatization and liberalization as occurred was reluctant, much of it only to comply with 
EU directives.  The biggest effect probably came from opening up air access into the 
country to competition.  One effect of this is that the Irish airline Ryanair has become the 
largest in Europe in terms market capitalization and played its part in the tourist boom of 
the 1990s.  
 
In view of the less-than-radical nature of the structural reforms that have been 
implemented, it is safe to conclude that not much of Ireland’s “employment miracle” 
should be attributed to them.  More formal support for this view comes from cross section 
and panel regressions that attempt to explain employment growth in the OECD countries 
using policy variables such as indices of employment protection legislation, taxes as a 
percentage of GDP, employee-employer coordination, replacement ratios, and so on 
(Garibaldi and Mauro, 2002).  Ireland lies consistently above these regression lines, 
showing that actual employment growth was much larger than predicted by models that 
try to explain it mainly in terms of changes in labour market policies. 
  
4.  Conclusion 
During the 1990s the Irish economy grew at an exceptional rate.  A key feature of this 
rapid growth was the unprecedented employment boom. This reduced the 
unemployment rate, raised the participation rate, and reversed the outflow of population 
from the country.  The sharp increase in the employment rate played a large part in 
Ireland’s belated, but very rapid, catch-up in living standards with the leading 
economies.     23 
 
In this paper the factors that contributed to the transformations of the Irish economy and 
labour market have been examined.   Favourable external shocks – the rapid growth of 
the world economy, large inflows of FDI and EU structural funds, and favourable 
exchange and interest rate developments and rising productivity (itself partly 
endogenous) – all played their part.  It was argued that once the Irish economy had 
recovered from the effects of the policy errors of the 1970s and the protracted recession 
of the 1980s, rapid employment growth was facilitated by a very elastic labour supply.  
The catalyst that converted this potential into employment was a reversal of the 
deteriorating trend in wage competitiveness.  Favourable exchange rate developments 
played their part in this but pride of place is usually given to the modest nominal wage 
settlements negotiated under the central wage agreements reintroduced in 1987.   But 
even if the return to “social partnership” and the government’s commitment to easing 
the income tax burden are given credit for the improved wage bargaining outcomes, the 
chastening effect of the unprecedented unemployment rate and the reduced strength of 
the trade union movement must be given credit for the new sense of realism that 
prevailed in wage negotiations.  That Irish unemployment rose so high in the mid-1980s 
was due to the level of unemployment reached in the UK and the lack of opportunities 
for Irish emigrants.  Paradoxically, in light of the eventual impact on Irish wage 
bargaining this too could be regarded as a favourable external shock. 
 
The exceptional performance of the Irish labour market during the 1990s was not 
triggered by radical structural reforms.  True, the disincentives to paid employment were 
reduced, the administration of the social welfare system became more rigorous, and a   24 
plethora of active labour market measures was launched, but these were not sufficiently 
far-reaching and some of them perhaps not so effective to account for much of the drop 
in the unemployment rate, much less the spectacular rise in the numbers in employment.  
 
Clearly, many of the factors behind the Irish success story are not relevant to other 
European economies or cannot be implemented by all countries simultaneously due 
their “beggar my neighbour” component. This is particularly true of the contribution of 
devaluations to improved competitiveness, but may also apply to the use of a low 
corporation tax regime to attract a larger share of FDI. None the less, a favourable 
environment for investment, moderate growth in wage costs, and a cooperative 
approach to industrial relations are policies that other countries might with benefit 
emulate.  But above all the Irish example shows the importance of rapid economic 
growth and how an output boom turned one of Europe’s worst-performing labour 
markets into one of the best in the course of a decade.   
 
The Irish economy has now entered a period of below-trend growth that on past 
evidence will lead to rising unemployment.  How profound was the transformation of 
the labour market during the 1990s will be judged by how high the unemployment rate 
rises during the slowdown and how quickly it falls as the economy returns to its long-
term growth path.  This assessment is a task for the future, but we can be hopeful that 
the changes documented here have their own momentum and that the force of hysteresis 
will now work in our favour as it worked against us in the 1980s.   25 
Appendix 1: Measuring competitiveness 
 
The measurement of “competitiveness” in Ireland has to confront the 
question of how to take account of productivity.  The structure of 
Irish industry has changed rapidly as new firms start up and older 
firms close. The new firms have been predominantly MNCs in “high 
tech” sectors.  Many have come to Ireland to take advantage of the 
low corporate profit tax rate (10 per cent during the 1990s).  As a 
consequence they inflate their recorded value added to a multiple of 
the comparable average for similar European firms.  This 
phenomenon is noticeable in the industrial statistics for “Software 
reproduction”, “Organic and basic chemicals”, “Computers”, and 
“Electronic components”.  The most extreme case is “Cola 
concentrates” where in 1999 value added per Irish employee was 
€1.25 million compared with a European average of €110,000.   
However, it is reasonable to suppose that the mix of firms within 
sectors in Ireland is more favourable that the European average, with 
a higher proportion of new enterprises producing genuinely high 
value products. 
 
These considerations also inflate Irish GDP.  Most of the excess 
profits generated by this process are eventually repatriated from the 
country and are subtracted from GDP when deriving GNP.  The 
GDP-GNP gap is now 18 per cent. 
 
A productivity-adjusted earnings series such as “unit wage costs in a 
common currency” is affected by the arrival of new firms of this type 
in a way that sheds no light on the trend in (unit) costs in established 
firms.  Nonetheless, it may be wrong to completely ignore the 
influence of this source of productivity growth because it affects 
employers’ willingness to pay for labour.   






Appendix 2:  Social partnership in Ireland 
 
In 1979 the first ‘National Understanding for Economic and Social Development’ was 
negotiated against a backdrop of disastrous industrial strife.  While this Agreement achieved a 
reduction in the level of strikes, a second Agreement collapsed in 1982 and there followed a 
five-year period of decentralised collective bargaining.   It was not until 1987 that a new 
National Agreement or Programme was negotiated.  This was the first of several whose ambition 
and scope grew exponentially, as the list of organisation involved in the negotiation of the most 
recent one shows.
1   The range of objectives has been extended far beyond the basic gaol of 
promoting industrial peace and keeping the economy competitive to include objectives like 
‘bringing about a fairer and more inclusive Ireland’ and ‘promoting an entrepreneurial culture’.  
With the advent of full employment and the tightness of the labour market after 2000, 
commentators have been increasingly sceptical of the appropriate of a new deal when the current 
one expires in 2003. 
 
Chronology of Irish corporatism 
Title of national agreement/programme  Period 
 
Programme for National Recovery 
 
1988-90 
Programme for Economic & Social Progress  1991-93 
Programme for Competitiveness and Work  1994-96/97 
Partnership 2000 for Inclusion, Employment & Competitiveness  1997-2000 
Programme for Prosperity and Fairness  2000-03 
 
1The parties to the latest negotiations included the Government, employers, trade unions, farmers 
and the community and voluntary sector as follows: Irish Business and Employers’ 
Confederation (IBEC), Irish Congress of Trade Unions (ICTU), Construction Industry 
Federation (CIF), Irish Farmers’ Association (IFA), Irish Creamery Milk Suppliers’ Association 
(ICMSA), Irish Co-Operative Organisation Society Ltd. (ICOS), Macra na Feirme, Irish 
National Organisation of the Unemployed (INOU), Congress Centres for the Unemployed, The 
Community Platform1, Conference of Religious of Ireland (CORI), National Womens’ Council 
of Ireland (NWCI), National Youth Council of Ireland (NYCI), Society of Saint Vincent de 
Paul, Protestant Aid, Small Firms’ Association (SFA), Irish Exporters’ Association (IEA), Irish 
Tourist Industry Confederation (ITIC) and Chambers of Commerce of Ireland (CCI). 
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